> I don't get into the details to that level because I don't think they will help me foresee the future--there's too much uncertainty and the situation is constantly changing.
> However it seems likely to me it was a planned withdrawal since the Russians and the Donbas forces withdrew in relatively good order with very little fighting.
Well, this is a good example of how delving into the details is useful. For starters, almost of the all initial reporting about the offensive came from pro-Kremlin sources, as Ukrainians embargoed the event (thus I learned about it from somebody who translated Rybar's map from Russian: https://twitter.com/DPiepgrass/status/1568252180569952257). These hardline milbloggers said "hordes" of Ukrainians broke through their lines, and did not buy the Russian MoD's later claim that it was a "planned withdrawal".
Then, after I had updated my probability for the last time on Sept 10, the hard evidence came in. All militaries understand that while it's bad to lose equipment, it's much worse to allow your equipment to fall into the hands of the enemy. So if one is forced to leave without one's equipment, one is supposed to destroy that equipment if possible. The fact that Russia captured a dozens of Ukrainian AFVs after the fall of Lysychansk was the key indicator that Ukraine's withdrawal was overly rapid and poorly organized. In the Kharkiv area this was even more important, because Ukraine used to have a relatively limited number of tanks and AFVs, so it was important for Russia not to let Ukraine have such equipment.
If it were a planned withdrawal, they would take their equipment with them. If it were a rapid but organized retreat, they would have taken some equipment and destroyed whatever they couldn't take. But by my count, Ukrainians captured about 400 vehicles (far more than the number destroyed by Ukrainian forces). Most of the captured vehicles were undamaged, indicating a rout (or "fleeing in panic", if you like). Even hardline pro-Kremlin milbloggers, who were the first to report the Ukrainian offensive (and said "hordes" of Ukrainians broke through their lines), don't buy the Russian MOD's claim that it was a planned withdrawal. Moreover, the capture of 27 T-80 tanks is significant - more on that topic from Perun, who correctly predicted the trajectory of the war back in March, conditional on strong western aid: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B93tLs39pQo
For a catalog of Russian equipment recorded as lost/captured at Oryx during, and just after, the Kharkiv blitzkrieg period, see here: https://twitter.com/DPiepgrass/status/1571245650704232448
Total losses recorded Sept. 4 to 17: 594
Total captured: 426
Total T-series tanks captured: 85
A small fraction of the captured vehicles were damaged, and some are from the Kherson front or other areas, as these lists are not broken down by location. However, I tried to apply a correction factor to estimate Russian losses that did not occur in the Kharkiv Counteroffensive. The result of my calculation was that in Kharkiv, Russia lost about 414 vehicles/pieces, of which Ukraine captured about 395, including about 82 tanks and even some fancier kit: https://twitter.com/DPiepgrass/status/1571258046839656448
Plus, the Russians really ought to have been able to hold off the apparently smaller Ukrainian force, and indeed I predicted that they would do so: https://twitter.com/DPiepgrass/status/1568353654088040448. I also noted that "If Russia can't push Ukraine back far enough or fast enough, RU could lose Izyum", but it didn't occur to me that they would simply flee Izyum in panic, leaving hundreds of vehicles behind, and even their ammo depos.
> Russia has been fighting this war with one arm behind its back. They have not mobilized and called for a general draft yet. If they begin to actually lose, that other arm will come out and they'll get serious.
As many Russia experts have explained, there is a very good reason why Putin hasn't mobilized: because it would be extremely risky for the regime. He hasn't even declared war. You know it's still illegal to call the "SMO" a war in Russia, right? The punishments start with fines of hundreds of dollars for the first offense, and escalate quickly from there. There are good reasons Putin has not changed his mind on this.
Just yesterday I asked Google a question, because I saw that Putin's approval rating dropped suddenly in mid-2018. As usual I employed the first virtue of rationality: curiosity. I wondered why. So I googled it. It turned out that Putin increased the retirement age from 60 to 65. And his approval rating did not recover until he invaded Ukraine in 2022, after many years of propaganda about how "Ukrainian Nazis oppress the Russian-speaking population". Experts agree: the population is depoliticized and their support for the "special military operation" is real but tepid. What Russians care about is domestic creature comforts. They've outsourced politics to Putin. So raising the retirement age was a big deal (especially since the elderly, who watch a lot of state TV, are Putin's base; statistics show higher support for Putin among the elderly).
And I've been watching Russian "everyman" sources such as 1420, too; the man on the street in Moscow and St. Petersburg agree - they have political opinions, but they don't know the details of what is going on. Those who want the invasion of Ukraine (mostly grey-haired people) want it because Ukraine is supposed to be full of "Nazis" and NATO forces who "provoked" Russia. Mobilizing would not only take hundreds of thousands of people away from their jobs (jobs that keep Russia's economy afloat) - it would force them to face the realities of war, and it would give them real military experience. What if they don't like it? Being forced into battle wouldn't just give them a hard lesson about lousy Russian commanders and military corruption. It could also turn a large group of people with military skills against the regime. If many people thought raising the retirement age to 65 was a step too far, what's mobilization going to do?
> Russia just destroyed that dam on the Inguletz river, and Ukraine's insane shelling of the nuke plant speaks for itself.
Both sides accuse each other of shelling the ZNPP, and I have seen no evidence that the Ukrainians did it. Russia merely saying Ukraine did it doesn't mean Ukraine did it, and in fact it doesn't make any sense for Ukraine to shell ZNPP unless they're very careful to hit military targets there. (Of course, Russia uses it as a military base, but I haven't seen evidence of Russia launching artillery from ZNPP so (1) I wouldn't expect Ukraine to counterattack at ZNPP and (2) if they did counterattack ZNPP, they would use HIMARS to avoid hitting any important infrastructure.)
And who would be harmed more by a nuclear disaster right in the center of Ukraine — Russia, or Ukraine? The answer is obvious. A rational man would ask who has something to gain by shelling the plant — and the answer is the Kremlin.
My guess is that Putin wanted an excuse to either shut down the ZNPP, or shut down Ukraine's access to power from ZNPP, because at this stage of the war, ZNPP benefits Ukraine more than it benefits Russia. Why? Because Ukraine, along with the rest of Europe, is suffering from a shortage of fossil fuels created by Putin. A fully functional ZNPP reduces Ukraine's need for fossil fuels — but now Putin has shut down ZNPP's connection to Ukraine's electrical grid in "response" to supposed Ukrainian shelling. Now Russia has shut down ZNPP entirely, probably at the IAEA's recommendation, so both sides must rely more on Russian fossil fuels. Putin should be happy with that, as Russia finds itself with a surplus of fossil fuels.
Russia destroyed grid infrastructure in the Kharkiv region, temporarily plunging millions of Ukrainians into darkness. Then they destroying one dam and tried to destroy another, as you mention. Obviously civilians were impacted much more than military operations, but both of these attacks had a military logic to them. Taking out the electrical grid temporarily stopped Ukrainian military trains in the Kharkiv region (and probably slowed down Ukrainian soldiers), and taking out the dam temporarily prevented Ukrainian forces from crossing the Inhuets river.
You seem to think Ukrainians should just give up now because they are suffering. But that's not up to us, is it? It's up to Ukrainians, and they won't quit, because they are completely convinced that they are going to win. I was skeptical about the timetable, but now I think that, given enough resources, they could push Russia roughly to the 2021 borders before winter is over.
> Ukraine should only keep fighting if it thinks it can improve it's position at the table. It just improved its position. Does it truly believe it will go on winning victories that will further improve the terms at the table?
98% of Ukrainians seemed to think so before the Kherson and Kharkiv offensives started. Recent news should only strengthen their resolve, if more optimism is even possible on their part! https://news.yahoo.com/poll-shows-98-ukrainians-believe-193801017.html
Having said all that, winter should slow the pace of operations on both sides, and Putin might create a humanitarian disaster, if he wants, by cutting fossil pipelines to Europe that go through Ukraine. But such an action would have little military benefit, and would be bad for Russia's economy.
Even if most of the EU were to stop shipping weapons to Ukraine - which is highly unlikely - Ukraine's weapon supplies would be cut by less than 50%, because the U.S. supplies about half of all Ukraine's weapons, and with land-lease that fraction will only grow larger. Plus, European countries on Russia's border are the strongest supporters of Ukraine (the numbers prove it: https://twitter.com/DPiepgrass/status/1567214503972196354), so there's no chance they stop donating, let alone block weapons deliveries.
And even if Ukraine's military hardware inflows are cut by 40%, Russia still lacks manpower, so this isn't necessarily enough to freeze the conflict, let alone put Russia back on the offensive. So, I don't think Putin is stupid enough to try it. On the other hand, he has to do *something*, so we'll see.
One thing I do wonder is whether Putin might put a pre-emptive nuclear strike back on the table (contrary to Russian military doctrine). Probably not, as the chance he would personally benefit seems low, especially as it is hardly guaranteed that such an order would be carried out.
> Let the Donbas go--they don't want to be part of Ukraine and have taken up arms to be free of it.
Nearly 100% of the arms in question came from Russia, and in 2022 most of those were put in the hands of people who were forced to fight (drafted). Why would you believe the Putin-backed separatists' 2014 "referendum" on Donbaas independence? Is there even one single poll in 2013 or 2014, before the separatist coup, saying that Donetsk and Luhansk wanted to even be independent? Putin didn't want a vote before the coup, he wanted one after, when separatists with guns would organize the event and decide its outcome.
However, many of the more pro-Ukrainian people in eastern Donbas probably did leave — if not right after the 2014 separatist coup, then parhaps after Putin sent tanks, heavy artillery, AA guns and soldiers on "vacation" in 2014. And if that wasn't enough to turn the region pro-Russia, perhaps the shutdown of independent or pro-Ukraine media did the job.
But now that the LNR and DNR authorities have destroyed the economy and forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to fight, they might not feel so pro-Kremlin anymore.
> Crimea is lost forever.
This may be true. As an official part of Russia, lots of actual Russians live there, and Crimea may have even supported independence before 2014. (Note, however, that the Kremlin's 2014 ballot did not even give Crimeans the option to remain in Ukraine, and despite that the result was rigged anyway). Moreover, Ukraine cut off Crimea's water supply in a power play with Putin, which should have gone hand-in-hand with Putin's TV channels to turn the population of Crimea against Ukraine.
